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The superiority of the objective theory of negligence comes from
the greater protection which it affords society against harmful conduct
resulting from deficiencies in knowledge, memory, observation, self-
control, and the like. As Holmes expressed it, "when men live in
society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of individual peculiari-
ties going beyond a certain point, is necessary to the general welfare."'1
For the protection of the group, the individual must conform to
acceptable modes of behavior. Since it can seldom be ascertained
whether a particular act will or will not result in injury, the general
types of behavior frequently causing injury (if their utility does not
justify the risk) are to be discouraged. The failure of an individual
to live among his fellows without subjecting them to undue risks Is
not to be condoned because he is anxious and solicitious for their well-
being. What the law has regard for is the general security, and it
imposes a standard to maintain that security. When the individual
acts, he must measure up to that standard at his peril of answering
for injurious consequences.
The idea that negligence is or involves a state of mind has been
quite generally abandoned. By predicating liability solely upon unde-
sirable consequences of dangerous conduct, the law discourages such
conduct, and thereby protects the general security. By punishing for
conduct causing harm because under like circumstances a reasonably
prudent man would not have engaged in such conduct, the law will
give protection to society against those individuals whose protestations
of pure intentions always accompany their undesirable behavior.
Despite the lack of uniformity among the writers as to what may
be considered by the jury "under the circumstances" of the particular
case, it is probably safe to say that outstanding physical defects, the
effects of which can be estimated in light of the experience of a jury,
and not merely speculated upon, are valid considerations. Insofar as
the effects of age, poor sense-perception, slowness of reaction, and the
like, are matters of conjecture for jurors, they are better left to be
"allowed for in the courts of Heaven" on the theory that a sacrifice of
individual interests is justified in the interests of society. "Men
must be able to assume that when their fellow men act affirmatively,
their action will be resonably safe, that is, will create no greater
risk of harm than the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the
community permits."'  MARnVIN M. TiNcEam
THE LIMITS OF OBJECTIVITY IN NEGLIGENCE
It is the purpose of this note to discuss the methods and standards
used by courts to determine whether an actor's conduct Involved
negligence toward a plaintiff injured thereby. The writer will show
first, what factors are essential for negligence to exist; second, assum-
ing every individual's conduct is measured by that degree of care which
" Holmes, op. cit. supra note 22.
8 Edgerton, supra note 17, at 868.
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a reasonably prudent man would exercise under the same or similar
circumstances, to what extent the particular characteristics of the actor
are considered a "circumstance", if at all; and third, will present a
summary and conclusion.
A person is negligent when the risk of danger brought into being
by his conduct outweighs the utility which the public or individual
derives from such conduct.' Negligence is conduct creating an unrea-
sonable risk of harm to others, conduct which would not be engaged in
by a reasonably prudent man under the circumstances.
In the determination of a standard by which to measure the par-
ticular actor's conduct, it follows that if his personal characteristics
are regarded as circumstances to be considered under the formula, the
court is refusing to place liability solely on the grounds that the
"motions" of the defendant's conduct produce harmful results, but Is
adding that these results must be weighed by the jury in the light of a
condition peculiar to this actor. Insofar as the court permits con-
sideration of individual characteristics the standard is subjective. Such
a standard is used where the actor has physical defects such as blind-
ness, deafness or lameness, and therefore he is forced to make greater
use of his other sound senses. 2 The same standard is equally applicable
to a negligent defendant as to a negligent plaintiff.3 However, where
the actor's liability is due to a functional disturbance, the decisions
seem uniformly to hold him to an objective standard because the
reasonable man responds in the situation whether the actor is paralyzed
with fright,' or is easily rattled,5 or even if he is drunk.6 The standard
man may have physical defects but not emotional ones and he con-
'Beatty v. Central Iowa R. Co., 58 Iowa 242, 12 N.W. 332 (1882);
Restatement of the Law of Torts, sec. 291, comment d.
2Rosenthal v. Chicago & A.R. Co., 255 Ill. 552, 99 N.E. 672 (1912);
Hill v. City of Glenwood, 124 Iowa 479, 100 N.W. 522 (1904); Neff v.
Town of Wellesley, 148 Mass. 487, 20 N.E. 111 (1889); Fenneman v.
Holden, 75 Md. 1, 22 Atl. 1049 (1891); Simms v. South Carolina R. Co.,
27 S.C. 268, 3 S.E. 301 (1887).
o Restatement of the Law of Torts, sec. 289, comment a, states: "The
rules which determine the contributory negligence of a plaintiff are ...
the same as those which determine the negligence of the defendant".
In other words, the same rules determining the reasonableness of the
actor's risk toward his own interests govern the reasonableness of the
risks he creates toward the interest of others.
' See Holland v. Tenn. R.R. Co., 91 Ala. 444, 8 So. 524, 527 (1890),
In which McAllan, J., said: "The fact, if it be one, that the intestate
was panic stricken, and his energies paralyzed, by the awful nature of
the Impending catastrophe, might be proper to be considered by the
jury, In determining what effort would amount to due diligence, or
what omission of effort would be negligence under all the circum-
stances, but no such consideration can relieve from the duty of
diligence on the one hand, or condone negligence on the other."
5Bessemer Land & Improvement Co. v. Campbell, 121 Ala. 50, 25
So. 793 (1899).
0Woods v. Board of Comm. of Tipton Co., 128 Ind. 289, 27 N.E.
611 (1891).
7 However, these cases are to be sharply distinguished from an
emergency situation, where the reasonably prudent man does make a
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forms to sober conduct. Likewise the actor's mental attributes such
as memory, foresight, bad judgment, intelligence, stupidity, clumsiness,
timidity, feelings, and will are considered immaterial in the formula,'
as well as his belief' and moral qualities." Dean Pound has put as the
"jural postulate" of society and the basis of our theory of negligence
that "men must be able to assume that their fellow men when they act
affirmatively, will do so with due care, that is, with the care which the
ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts, with
respect to consequences that may reasonably be anticipated.""
The actor's knowledge, as a circumstance, may be grouped into
three classifications: First, where the wrongdoer has certain knowl-
edge but fails to act in accordance with it, he is held to be negligent
if a reasonable man having such knowledge would have acted differ-
ently. When a blind man voluntarily puts himself into a situation
having knowledge of his physical defects, Professor Seavey points out,
negligence is not predicated on the fact that he is blind, but because he
knows he is blind and failed to do an act required of men knowing
themselves blind." A person in this class is charged with notice of the
situation and the law will hold him to an objective standard;"-the
mistake. Even though a wise course of action was open to the
defendant, he may still incur no liability if he acted as the standard
man would have acted in the emergency situation. Austin v. Eastern
Mass. St. Ry., 269 Mass. 420, 169 N.E. 484 (1929); Terry, Negligence,
(1915) 29 Har. L. Rev. 40, 49.
8Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence and Indifference: The .Rela-
Ition of Mental States to Negligence, (1926) 39 Har. L. Rev. 849, 856-857;
Holmes, The Common Law (1881) 108; Seavey, Negligence-Subiective
or Objective? (1927) 41 Har. L. Rev. 1, 15; Restatement of Torts, see.
291, comment c of subsection 1. But see Green, The Negligence Issue,
(1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1029, 1045-1046, where the author says: "The law
cannot deal with these factors in detail; therefore, it ignores them.
They merely make up the 'circumstances' of the case."
'Teepen v. Taylor, 141 Mo. App. 282, 124 S.W. 1062 (1910); Hover
v. Barkhoof, 44 N.Y. 113, 117 (1870); Mertz v. Conn. Co., 217 N.Y. 475,
112 N.E. 166, 167 (1916); Edgerton, supra note 8, at 855.
"Seavey, supra note 8, at 10: "That a purely objective standard
applies to moral qualities is beyond question".
2 Pound, Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (1922) 170.
" Seavey, supra note 8, at 23.
"Reynolds v. Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co., 162 Cal. 327, 122
Pac. 962 (1912); Buckley v. Westchester Lighting Co., 93 App. Div. 436,
87 N.Y.S. 763 (1904); City of Charlottesville v. Jones, 123 Va. 682, 97
S.E. 316 (1918). Other conceivable illustrations of this first class may
be where a danger signal is not heeded by the actor in a location
with which he knows he is unfamiliar; here he is forced to use
greater care than the residents. Ship captain leaves a strange port in
the face of a storm, knowing of his unfamiliarity with the harbor, but
thinking he can get back into port if the storm breaks, he assumes
the risk. Instead the ship is badly injured, and he is held liable for
the damage. The country doctor who sets himself up as a cancer
specialist in a large city, and many other situations could be easily
thought of. It is submitted that the doctor is negligent not because of
his failure to have the knowledge he purports to have, but because he
STUDENT NOTES
fact that he forgot is not one of the circumstances for the jury. In the
second class, the actor is charged with knowledge he in fact does not
have but is presumed to have." One who is in fact ignorant of the
dangerous propensities of nitro-glycerine, of wild animals and other
facts of common knowledge to the community is held to accountability
as if he had such knowledge because a reasonably prudent man would
have known, or would have recognized the necessity of making a fur-
ther Investigation. The actor is being strictly penalized for the con-
sequences of his unreasonably dangerous physical conduct "though his
state of mind is not blameworthy". This leads to the third classifica-
tion, where the wrongdoer, for example, a physician, is possessed of
special knowledge or skill. Being a member of that class, he must
exercise that degree of care and skill which he holds himself out as
possessing, and which is posssesed by the ordinary reasonably cautious
physician practicing in the same or a similar locality at the time of
the treatment in question.17 And evidence as to what is customarily
done in the locality in question does not establish the standard of care
to which those who carry it on must conform.13 It will be noticed that
in these cases the profession of the actor and the locality of his practice
enter the formula as circumstances.
The standard for a child charged with negligence is commonly
stated to be that degree of care which ordinary prudent children of his
age, intelligence and experience (or other combination such as alert-
ness, understanding, education, sex) ordinarily exercise under the
same or similar circumstances. ' "An exception is made" says Mr.
has entered upon an undertaking in which he knows he should not
have entered. Knowing these facts it may be unreasonable for him
to act at all.
"Restatement of Torts, sec. 289, comments I and m.
IsEdgerton, supra note 8, at 855: "Though one need not actually
use or have any particular mental chracteristic In order to be free
from negligence, one must act as if he had (as safely as if he had)
a normal complement of all mental characteristics which would be use-
ful in avoiding harm in the particular circumstances". (Italics
writer's.)
"' Terry, supra note 7, at 41.
17Ferrell v. Ellis, 129 Iowa 614, 105 N.W. 993 (1906); Nelson v.
Sandell, 202 Iowa 109, 209 N.W. 440 (1927); Rann v. Twitchell, 82 Vt.
79, 71 At. 1045 (1909); Harper, Torts (1933) 168, sec. 71; Green,
supra note 8, at 1040; Note (1909) 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1030.
Is Bohlen, Some Recent Decisions on Tort Liability, (1930) 4 Tulane
L. R. 370, 379. Professor Bohlen explains: "This is subject to one
limitation, that a certain minimum of general professional competence
Is always required no matter how isolated or poor the neighborhood.
Except for this latter restriction, it is the standard of the profession
which determines the skill and competence which the physician must
exercise". See also Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 49 N.E. 760 (1898);
Ault v. Hall, 119 Ohio St. 422, 164 N.E. 518 (1928); Davis v. Kerr,
239 Pa. 351, 86 At. 100 (1913).
"' See Green, supra note 8, at 1039, footnote 25; Harper, supra note
17, at 161-62, sec. 71; Restatement, Torts (Tent. Draft No. 1), sec. 167.
One of the leading cases upholding this view is Charbonneau v. Mac-
Rury, 84 N.H. 501, 153 At. 457 (1931); Noted in 17 Va. L.R. 698 (1931).
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Justice Snow, "in favor of infants because their normal condition is
one of capacity and the state of their progress toward maturity is
reasonably capable of determination".1 If the child's age and capacity
are disregarded as circumstances, the child would often be held to an
absolute liability to do that which he is incapable of doing. The
standard is the same whether the child be negligent or contributorily
negligent-
In summary, the following conclusions may be drawn from the
foregoing discussion: First, that "under the circumstances" is not a
general catch-all phrase to serve as a basket to receive all the facts of
the case.-This phrase has boundaries to be observed as a definite guide
to the jury. To determine in each case what is and what is not to be
considered in it is the duty of the court. Second, that only where it
would be obviously unfair, with reference to the actor's physical defects
and very marked mental abnormality should the objective formula be
deviated from, and not then unless such defect was the proximate cause
of the actor's failure to act as a reasonable man. It is submitted,
however, that this in no sense is creating a subjective standard, but is
an objective standard for all members of the actor's class with the
same attribute. With reference to all his other qualities he is treated
as the "average man". Third, the writer recommends that as between
the two theories for approaching the problem-one stating that negli-
gence is conduct, the other saying that negligence is a state of mind-
the former is the better criterion in the determination of the standard
and the one actually used by the courts. In the situations where the
objective standard is applied to the physically subnormal individual,
a failure to recognize his subnormality would be unjust to him, while
as concerns the person possessing skill, a failure to take into account
his special knowledge would be unjust to the public. However, "for
each individual to have a different valuation of interests would
destroy the law and would be a disregard for the rights of others".22
As to whether the same standard for the determination of negli-
gence is applied in the law of crimes, there is lack of uniformity.
Criminal negligence being fundamentally the same in kind as that
giving rise to civil liability, the only difference is one of degree." The
2'Charboneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 153 Atl. 457, 463 (1931).
21It was said in Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 153 A.
457, 464 (1931), that "In neither case does the law make any distinction
between the conduct of an actor when charged with actionable fault
and when charged with contributory negligence". The court makes
it clear that in an action for negligence, whether a minor is charged
with primary or contributory negligence, he is subject to the same
rule of reasonable conduct in view of all the circumstances. See also
Briese v. Maechtle, 146 Wis. 89, 130 N.W. 893 (1911); Ames & Smith,
Selection of Cases on the Law of Torts (3rd Ed. 1936), Vol. 1, 101, foot-
note 1; Harper, op. cit. supra note 17, at 297, sec. 133, and at 162, foot-
note 41; Terry, supra note 7, at 47.
2 Seavey, supra note 8, at 11.
1 This proposition is well expressed in Nail v. State, 33 Okla, Cr.
100, 242 Pac. 270 (1925), in which the court said: "When do the negli-
gent acts of an individual cease to be mere negligence and become
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fact that negligence to be criminal must be what is classed as reckless
or gross" is not sufficient reason to necessitate a different standard,
which measures the actor's conduct, or even the addition of other sub-
jective elements.2 Requiring negligence to be gross in order to be
criminal is not requiring that the actor have a reckless, careless, oX
culpable state of mind. That negligence to be criminal must be gross
means simply that the actor's negligent conduct must involve such a
high and patent risk of harm to others that society imposes, as an
additional restraining influence, criminal liability. But having made
this analysis, the question that immediately presents itself is, how does
gross negligence furnish the necessary mens rea required in crimes?
Gross negligence which results in homicide is said to be sufficient to
supply2l or to substitute forn intent. Mr. Justice Holmes states, "The
law requires men at their peril to know the teachings of common
experience, just as it requires them to know the law". It is sub-
mitted that the objective standard for determining criminal liability is
In harmony with the modern trend in criminal law to give less con-
sideration to the criminal's intent and to look primarily to the
sociological harm threatened by his behavior.
E. PRESTON YOUNG
CONFLICT OF LAWS-JURISDICTION FOR DIVORCE-EXTRA-
TERRITORIAL VALIDITY OF EX PARTE DIVORCES
For the purpose of this discussion the following hypothetical case
is proposed:
H and W were married in state X where they lived as husband
and wife for several years. H left W in state X and went to state Y
where he established a bona fide domicil. He then sued for a divorce
on the ground of desertion, having service by publication upon his
wife. H obtained a default decree in state Y and later married W
number two. After living with W number two for several years he
died, leaving real property in state X, state Y and state Z. W number
culpable or criminal negligence? What is the test by which criminal
responsibility becomes a consequence of a negligent act? But in his
excellent work, 'Negligence in Law,' vol. 3, p. 7, says: '. . .Between
criminal negligence, however, and actionable negligence, there is no
principle of discrimination, but a question of degree only'."
21Fitzgerald v. State, 112 Ala. 34, 20 So. 966 (1895); People v.
Adams, 289 Ill. 339, 124 N.E. 575 (1919); People v. Sikes, 328 Ill. 64,
159 N.E. 293 (1927); People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148 N.W. 400
(1914).
2 Levitt, Extent and Functions of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, (1923)
17 Ill. L.R. 578: "At the present time, I think, the subjective aspect is
practically eliminated as an element of any specific crime, and main-
tains whatever hold it has because of the idea that a crime is an act
for which the offender must be punished."
2Id. at 578-79.
27People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148 N.W. 400 (1914) "....
equivalent to a criminal intent". 12 Harv. L.R. (1899) 428.
"Holmes, supra note 8, at 57. Accord: Com. v. Pierce, 138 Mass.
165, 179 (1884).
